The relation between typologies of executive and
technological performances of nations
MARIO COCCIAa,b
ORCID ID: 0000-0003-1957-6731 Country: IT a
CNR-IRCRES,
National Research Council, Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth,
via Real Collegio 30, Moncalieri (TO) – Italy b
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY, Center for Social Dynamics &
Complexity, 550 East Orange St., Tempe, Arizona | 85287 Mail: mario.coccia@ircres.cnr.it, mario.coccia@cnr.it
ABSTRACT 
The general
determinants of socioeconomic and technological performance are of profound
interest in social and political sciences to understand the historical
developmental paths of nations. The vast literature has suggested several
approaches to explain the differences of technological performances among
nations, such as the varieties of capitalism’s theory of innovation argues that
a dissimilar behaviour of political institutions is a principal driver of
differences in national innovative behaviour. However, in the varieties of
capitalism and other frameworks, the notion of state power and the relation
between typologies of executive, technological and socioeconomic performances
of countries are generally absent. The present study confronts these problem and
endeavours of analyzing the nexus
(relation) between leadership-oriented executives, technological and
socioeconomic performances of nations. Results show that high levels of
technological performance of nations seem to be associated to executive with parliamentary
monarchy and monarchy (leadership-oriented government), whereas nations with
mixed executive tend to have lower performances. A possible reason of these
results is that, in general, some typologies of executive leadership-oriented
(e.g., Monarchy) support the political stability of countries with subsequent
fruitful socioeconomic developmental paths over the long run. In short, the
study here shows the vital role of the structure of government in national
systems of innovation and in particular how leadership oriented executives can
support socioeconomic performances of countries. Overall, then, the structure
of executives might be one of contributing factors to explain dissimilar
patterns of technological innovation and economic growth of nations over
time.
KEYWORDS
Varieties of
Capitalism; Technological Performance; Leadership; Executive; Government;
Technology; Socioeconomic Performance; Political Stability.
JEL CODES:
O11, P16, P51
Reference to this paper should be made as follows:
Coccia M. (2017) "The relation between typologies
of executive and technological performances
of nations", Working Paper CNR-IRCRES, vol. 3, n. 1, pp. 1-25, ISSN
(on line): 2421-7158.
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32991.05287
CONTENTS
The relation between typologies of executive and
technological performances of nations
MARIO COCCIA
1. INTRODUCTION
The general
determinants of socioeconomic and technological performance of nations are of
profound interest in social and political sciences to understand the historical
developmental paths over time[1].
Many studies have analyzed several determinants of technical change and
economic growth, such as the democratization (Coccia, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2008), demographic change and
population (Coccia, 2014), religion and culture (Guiso et al., 2003; Coccia,
2014a), energy systems (Coccia, 2010a, 2010b), climate (Smithers and
Blay-Palmer, 2001; Coccia, 2015a), new products (Calabrese et al., 2005;
Cavallo et al., 2014; 2014a; 2015;
Coccia, 2016)[2],
institutional evolution (Acemoglu et al., 2005), regulation of public action
(Guenoun and Tiberghien, 2007), quality of local governance (Van Roosbroek and
Van Dooren, 2010), political economy of R&D investments (Coccia, 2008,
2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2012, 2010c, 2013; Coccia and Rolfo, 2000; Rolfo and
Coccia, 2005), technology transfer (Coccia, 2004, 2010d; Coccia and Rolfo,
2002; Cariola and Coccia, 20004), radical innovation (Coccia, 2016; 2016a,
2016b) scientific collaboration (Coccia and Wang, 2016; Coccia and Bozeman,
2016); reforms of central government (Adhikari et al., 2012), etc. In general, institutions play a vital role in
national innovation systems because they are one of the main elements of the
complex network of economic agents that supports the process of technical
advance in economy (Coccia, 2010). In particular, political institutions
influence innovative activities by developing a set of laws, policies, norms,
and infrastructures under which interactions between economic subjects, groups,
and organizations take place for wealth creation and sustainability (cf., Olstrom, 1990; Edquist, 2005;
Spencer et al., 2005). A theoretical framework linking national-level
institutions to innovative activity differences across countries is the
varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach by Hall and Soskice (2001).
The varieties of
capitalism’s (VOC) theory of technological innovation claims that variance in
political institutions is the principal determinant of differences in national
innovative behaviour: “more a polity allows the market to structure its
economic relationships, the more the polity will direct its inventive activity
toward industries typified by ‘radical’ technological change. Conversely, the
more a polity chooses to coordinate economic relationships via nonmarket
mechanisms, the more it will direct its inventive activity toward ‘incremental’
technological change” (Taylor, 2004, p. 601). The state, the strengths of its
authority and social power are important characteristics that influence
economic systems, policy and relationships of economic subjects for fostering
innovation and industries (Broberg et
al., 2013). In general, the leadership is a feature that can improve the
technological and socioeconomic performances of complex organizations (Zaccaro,
2007; Makri and Scandura, 2010; Ryan and Tipu, 2013). However, in the varieties
of capitalism’s theory of technological innovation and in other theoretical
frameworks, the concept and role of structure of executive, state power and
leadership of government are generally absent (cf., Taylor, 2004; Broberg et
al., 2013). Especially, in this research field, the relation between
typologies of executive and technological performances of countries is hardly
known. A main research question is how
typologies of executive affect national level of innovative activity. The
problem underlying this research question is to explain the institutional
determinants of dissimilar technological and economic performance of countries.
This study confronts this problem and endeavours to integrate whenever
possible, the varieties of capitalism framework by analyzing the relation
between types of executive and technologicalsocioeconomic performance of
nations. In particular, this essay here has two goals. The first is to show
that different patterns of technological innovations of nations may be also
affected by dissimilar structures of executive. The second is to show that some
typologies of executive can be more leadership-oriented, maintain political
stability and support innovative activity of nations. Before analyzing and
clarifying this socioeconomic issue, next sections present the theoretical
background and methodology of this study.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In economics of
technical change, questions about the institutional causes of differences in
technological performances of nations have remained at the periphery of
research fields (Taylor,
2004). In this
context, the varieties of capitalism’s (VOC) theory of technological innovation
makes its foray to explain cross-national differences of technological
performances and dissimilar directions of technological progress among nations.
VOC is a theory of capitalism in which: “some countries use markets more than
others to coordinate economic actors and this variation is used to explain a
myriad of comparative and international political-economic behaviour” (Taylor,
2004, p. 603).
This theoretical
framework argues that national institutions affect firms and other economic
subjects by coordinating their socioeconomic activities. Countries in VOC
theory can be either liberal market economies (LMEs), which are based on
competitive market arrangements or coordinating market economies (CMEs) that
are based on non-market arrangements of collaborating networks of interacting
firms/economic subjects (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The variation of coordinating
mechanisms can influence patterns of innovation and economic activity of
countries. In particular, economic subjects (firms, universities, public
research organizations, etc.) operating within LMEs tend to produce more
radical innovation, whereas economic subjects in CMEs tend to generate more
incremental innovation (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Taylor, 2004; Broberg et al., 2013, pp. 2575ff). An alternative framework in this
research field is by Spencer et al.
(2005) that include the structure of the state and society:
the
structure of the state encompasses strong state structures where government
authority is derived inherently from the state or weak state structures where
government authority originates from the people. The structure of the society
varies according to whether a country is organized along the interest of
individuals (i.e., associational structures) or to the interests of groups of
individuals (i.e., corporatists)-(Broberg et al.,2013, p. 257).
Spencer et al.
(2005) argue that different features of the structure of state and society
generate four institutional types of nations: State corporatist, Social
corporatist, Liberal pluralist and State nation. These theories have not been
confirmed in empirical studies (Taylor, 2004; Broberg et al., 2013). While the
validity of certain of criticisms may be debated, it is clear that there are at
least some facts about differences of technological performances of countries
that these approaches have trouble explaining. The general consensus among
scholars is that the varieties of capitalism’s theory of innovation and theory
by Spencer et al. (2005) are in need of additional explanatory elements that
better explain economic and innovation differences across countries (cf., Campbell and Pedersen, 2007;
Broberg et al., 2013, pp. 2575ff).
A main
variable, not included in these theoretical frameworks, is the leadership based
on the structure of executive (Zaccaro, 2007; Avrey et al., 2006; cf., Klavans
and Boyack, 2008). As a matter of fact,
the examination of the relation between leadership and innovation is basic
since leader systems can positively influence innovation processes and
innovative activities of economic subjects (cf.,
Howell and Avolio, 1993).
Leadership is
defined in terms of: “ (a) influencing individuals to contribute to group goals
and (b) coordinating the pursuit of those goals . . . . leadership as building
a team and guiding it to victory” (Van Vugt et
al., 2008, pp. 182-3). “Leadership is a solution to the problem of
collective effort –the problem of bringing people together and combining their
efforts to promote success and survival” (Kaiser at al., 2008, p. 96). Some studies argue that the leadership is a
universal feature of human societies, which affects the population and citizens
in important ways (Van Vugt et al., 2008, p. 182; Bennis, 2007).
In fact,
“Leadership … has a long evolutionary history …. Arguably, individual fitness
would be enhanced by living in groups with effective leadership (Van Vugt et
al., 2008, p. 184). Leadership is also a system of relationships that involves
the power in varying degrees in organizations (cf., Hollander and Offermann, 1990).
Galton
defined leadership with two main features (as quoted by Zaccardo, 2007, pp. 6ff): 1) as a unique property of
extraordinary individuals whose decisions are capable of sometimes radically
changing the streams of history; 2) the unique attributes of such individuals
in their inherited or genetic makeup (see
Zhang et al., 2009 for the genetic
basis and gene-environment interactions on leadership role). Arvey et al. (2006, pp. 2-4) claim that the
leadership role occupancy is associated with genetic factors influencing the
personality variables, such as social potency and achievement of specific
goals. “Galton. . . argued that the personal qualities defining effective
leadership were naturally endowed, passed from generation to generation”
(Zaccaro, 2007,
p. 6). The
leadership is in general affected by the situational context (cf. Vroom and Jago, 2007, pp. 17ff) and social environment around
economic subjects (Zhang et al.,
2009). In fact, Porter and Mc Laughlin (2006, p. 559) state that: “leadership
in organization does not take place in a vacuum. It takes place in
organizational contexts”.
Many studies
argue that the leadership is one of the most important determinants for
improving innovation and performance in organizations. Jung et al. (2003) show a positive linkage
between style of leadership, called “transformational”, organizational
innovation and innovationsupporting organizational climate. Krause (2004)
considers the leadership in terms of specific factors of influence (such as
granting freedom and autonomy, openness of the decision-making process, etc.)
for innovative behaviour of organizations.
Other
scholars, such as Makri and Scandura (2010, pp. 85-86), show that the
leadership seems to be an important driver of firm’s ability to innovate.
Carmeli et al. (2010) confirm that
the leadership significantly enhances the performance of firms. In particular,
transformational leadership tends to be a catalyst in enhancing organizational
outcomes and innovation propensity (Ryan and Tipu, 2013, p. 2119; Gardner and
Avolio, 1998; Howell and Avolio, 1993). In short, the examination of the
leadership–innovation connection is important in advancing and developing
country context in the presence of intense competition, institutional
instability and macroeconomic volatility (Tybout, 2000).
Although the
vast literature in these topics, social studies lack of an integrative
theoretical framework, which explains the relation between the leadership in
the structure of executive and technological performances of countries.
In fact, type
of executive and dominant political class can play a main role for
socioeconomic performances of nations. Mosca (1933) showed that the politicians
can be considered as leader entrepreneurs and their activities are similar to
political enterprises (cf.,
Schumpeter (1975 [1942]). Weber (1919) argued that the essence of democracy
consists of having charismatic leaders, which can be able to contrast the
powers of the bureaucracy, to affect political institutions and support policy
and economic outcomes (cf. also
Persson and Tabellini, 2001) [3].
In general, several studies show that
political structures can affect, positively or negatively, economic development
of nations (Radu, 2015; Coccia, 2010). Some important typologies of executive
in the geopolitical structure of nations are as follows:
Monarchy
is a form of executive in which a group,
usually a family called the dynasty, embodies the country's
national identity and one of its members, called the monarch, exercises a role of
sovereignty.
Parliamentary
monarchy is a state headed by a monarch who is not actively
involved in policy formation or implementation but it has a main institutional
role; governmental leadership (formally) is carried out by a cabinet and its head – such as a
prime minister, premier, etc. - who are
drawn from a legislature (parliament).
Mixed executive can be a parliamentary system of
government: the executive branch
of government has
the direct or indirect support of the parliament (vote of confidence).
Parliamentary systems usually have a head of government and a head of state. The head of
government is the prime minister,
who has the real power.
This
theoretical background shows that the national institutions, the structure of
executive and associated leadership can play a vital role in economic and
social activity of nations.
This study
here endeavours to integrate whenever possible, the theoretical frameworks of
VOC and Spencer et al. (2005) by analyzing the relation between typologies of
executive and innovative activities to explain the difference in technological
and socioeconomic performances of countries.
The following
sections present methodology and results about this nexus (connection) to clarify, as far as possible, one of
contributing factors that affects the socio-economic progress and dissimilar
historical developmental paths of nations.
3. METHODOLOGY AND WORKING HYPOTHESIS
Suppose
that:
-
A nation
is a system that can produce the same outcome in different ways.
-
Monarchy
and parliamentary monarchy are based on stronger authority and
leadership-oriented structure of executive.
-
Mixed
executives are a type of government of nations not based on leadershiporiented government and with lower social
power.
The focal
hypothesis of this study is:
Hypothesis
α (HP α): Nations with leadership-oriented executives (Monarchy and
Parliamentary Monarchy) have higher technological and economic performances
than Mixed executive (not leadership-oriented executive), ceteris paribus.
Figure 1. Linkages between
leadership-oriented executive and high levels of technological and economic
performances of nations
The purpose
of the present study is to see whether the statistical evidence supports this
hypothesis α that leadership-oriented
executives are positively associated to higher technological and economic
performances as represented in figure 1.
The source of
Data is the Democracy Time-series Dataset by Norris (2008). The sample is based
on all countries present in this dataset (Norris, 2008). The period under study
is over 2010s. The study here considers the following classification of
executive: parliamentary monarchy and monarchy that are assumed to be
leadership-oriented executives, whereas mixed executive is supposed to be a not
leadership-oriented executive[4].
In particular, Monarchy in the study here includes 13 countries; Parliamentary
Monarchy includes 31 countries and Mixed executive includes 92 countries that
for the sake of briefness, the list is not described in Appendix A. The
socio-economic variables and related years under study are:
-
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
purchasing power parity (PPP) annual by World Bank (2008). GDP is a measure of
the economic activity. It is defined as the value of all goods and services
produced minus the value of any goods or services used in their creation.
-
Human Development Index (HDI) 2002 year (UNDP,
2004). The HDI is a summary
measure of average achievement in key
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable
and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is based on three dimensions: The
health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth; the education
dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and
more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age; the
standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita.
The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a
composite index using geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the
three dimensions (UNDP, 2016).
-
Kaufmann political stability 2006. It measures
perceptions of the likelihood that the
government will
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including
political violence and terrorism (WGI, 2016; Thomas, 2010).
-
A main proxy of the technological potential of
countries is the Energy consumption in Kilograms per capita and Electric power
production (KWh) per capita.
The
preliminary statistical analysis is performed with Arithmetic mean and Standard
Deviation (SD) of these variables per typology of executive. Normality of
distributions is checked with skewness and kurtosis coefficients. A logarithmic
transformation is performed, when necessary, to obtain a normal distribution
and apply correctly statistical analyses. The descriptive statistics are also
represented with bar charts with average values of variables on y-axis and typology of executive on x-axis.
The main
statistical analysis of this study compares the arithmetic means of key
variables between specific executives by applying the Independent Samples T Test: this parametric test compares
the means of two independent groups (e.g.,
Monarchy/Parliamentary Monarchy vs.
Mixed Executive) in order to determine whether the associated population means
of variables among these sets of countries are significantly different. The
null hypothesis (H0) and
alternative hypothesis (H1)
of the independent samples T test
here are given by:
H0: µ1 = µ2
(i.e., arithmetic mean of
Monarchy/Parliamentary Monarchy is
equal to Mixed Executives)
H1: µ1 µ2 (i.e., arithmetic mean of
Monarchy/Parliamentary Monarchy is NOT
equal to Mixed Executives)
This technique is a simple and reliable
test to see whether statistical evidence supports the hypothesis α
that nations governed by leadership-oriented executives (e.g., Parliamentary Monarchy and
Monarchy) have higher technological and economic performances than countries
with Mixed executives (a not leadership-oriented executive), ceteris paribus. Statistical analyses are performed by means of the Statistics Software
SPSS version 15.0.
4. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
This section endeavors to substantiate the hypothesis α
underlying the model of Figure 1.
This study, as
said above, hypothesizes that nations with a leadership-oriented executive, e.g., Monarchy and Parliamentary
Monarchy, have levels of socioeconomic and technological performances higher
than Mixed Executives over time. Results of the descriptive statistics per
typology of executive are in table 1.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of
variables per typology of executive
Electric
Human Kaufmann Energy power
Classification GDP
Development Political Consumption production of executive per capita U$
Index 2002 Stability 2006 Kg per Capita (KWh)
per Capita
|
Parliamentary Monarchy
|
Mean
SD
|
$11,055.52 $9,808.20
|
0.83
0.13
|
0.597
0.829
|
3,434.97
3,432.64
|
16,121.58
30,614.85
|
|
Monarchy
|
Mean
|
$7,374.17
|
0.71
|
0.336
|
5,973.11
|
6,985.32
|
|
|
SD
|
$5,512.96
|
0.13
|
0.721
|
7,912.94
|
12,226.46
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mixed
Executive
|
Mean
SD
|
$5,757.65
$6,668.25
|
0.68
0.18
|
0.189
0.975
|
1,523.56
2,198.42
|
5,531.86
12,007.55
|
Note: SD is Standard Deviation
Figure 2. Average GDP per capita in U$
per typology of executive
Figure 3. Average index of Human
Development per typology of executive
Figure 4. Average energy consumption (kg
per capita) per typology of executive
Figure 5. Average electric power
production (in kwh per capita) per typology of executive
Figure 6. Average Kaufmann political
stability 2006 per typology of executive
Figures 2-5
show that nations with parliamentary monarchy/monarchy have higher average
levels of GDP per capita, HDI, and proxies of technological and economic
performances.
One of the
contributing factors that explains these results can be due to higher political
stability of monarchy and parliamentary monarchy than mixed executive (cf. Tab. 1 and Fig. 6).
A logarithmic
transformation is performed on some indicators to have normality of
distribution and apply correctly further statistical analyses. Table 2 shows
that the p-value of Test for Equality of Means (equal variances
not assumed) is p < 0.05. In
particular, considering this test, there is a significant difference at 5% in
arithmetic mean performance of human development index (HDI), GDP per capita,
electric power production and energy consumption per capita between countries
with parliamentary monarchy/monarchy and mixed executive.
In short,
results here seem to show that countries with leadership-oriented executives (e.g., Parliamentary Monarchy and
Monarchy) have a significant (statistically) higher average levels of economic
and technological performance than countries with Mixed executive.
Table 2. Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test
T-test for Equality of Means
for Equality of Variances
|
LN GDP per
capita PPP annual
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Parliamentary
Monarchy and
Mixed executive
|
Equal variances assumed
|
25.024
|
0.00
|
17.727
|
2614
|
|
0.00
|
|
|
Equal variances not assumed
|
|
|
18.572
|
1651.818
|
|
0.00
|
|
Mixed executive and Monarchy
|
Equal variances assumed
|
23.605
|
0.00
|
7.219
|
2133
|
|
0.00
|
|
|
Equal variances not assumed
|
|
|
8.152
|
454.784
|
|
0.00
|
Sig.
Human development index 2002 F Sig. T df (2-tailed)
Parliamentary
|
Monarchy and Mixed executive
|
Equal variances
195.576
assumed
|
0.00
|
21.14
|
3052.00
|
0.00
|
|||||||||||||||
|
|
Equal variances not assumed
|
|
24.62
|
2225.60
|
0.00
|
|||||||||||||||
|
Mixed executive and Monarchy
|
Equal variances
58.702
assumed
|
0.00
|
2.82
|
2555
|
0.005
|
|||||||||||||||
|
|
Equal variances not assumed
|
|
3.58
|
619.999
|
0.00
|
|||||||||||||||
|
LN
Kaufmann political stability 2006
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||||||||
|
Parliamentary
Monarchy and
Mixed executive
|
Equal variances assumed
|
2.742
|
0.102
|
2.162
|
68
|
0.034
|
||||||||||||||
|
|
Equal variances not assumed
|
|
|
2.321
|
66.361
|
0.023
|
||||||||||||||
|
Mixed executive and Monarchy
|
Equal variances assumed
|
2.887
|
0.096
|
1.418
|
48
|
0.163
|
||||||||||||||
|
|
Equal variances not assumed
|
|
|
2.219
|
14.699
|
0.043
|
||||||||||||||
|
LN Energy consumption in kg per capita
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||
|
Parliamentary
Monarchy and
Mixed executive
|
Equal variances
30.271
assumed
|
0.00
|
11.958
|
1458
|
0.00
|
|||||||||||||||
|
|
Equal variances not assumed
|
|
13.031
|
848.020
|
0.00
|
|||||||||||||||
|
Mixed executive and Monarchy
|
Equal variances
12.916
assumed
|
0.00
|
6.854
|
1230
|
0.00
|
|||||||||||||||
|
|
Equal variances not assumed
|
|
5.965
|
204.485
|
0.00
|
|||||||||||||||
|
LN
Electric power production (KWh) per capita
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||
|
Parliamentary
Monarchy and
Mixed executive
|
Equal variances
13.783
assumed
|
0.00
|
14.722
|
2533
|
0.00
|
|||||||||||||||
|
|
Equal variances not assumed
|
|
15.351
|
1402.081
|
0.00
|
|||||||||||||||
|
Mixed executive and Monarchy
|
Equal variances
17.344
assumed
|
0.00
|
6.058
|
2135
|
0.00
|
|||||||||||||||
|
|
Equal variances not assumed
|
|
6.707
|
458.473
|
0.00
|
|||||||||||||||
Figure 7. Empirical results of the
linkage between Monarchy and Parliamentary Monarchy Executive and higher
average levels of technological and economic performances, ceteris paribus
Figure 8. Empirical results of the
linkage between Mixed executive and lower average levels of technological and
economic performances, ceteris paribus
Hence,
parliamentary monarchy/monarchy nations seem to have average levels of
socioeconomic and technological performances higher than countries with mixed
executive. These results are consistent with the hypothesis α stated above about the possible (positive) effect of leadership-oriented
executives on technological and economic performances of nations, ceteris paribus. This result can be due
to some systematic factors of nations, such as the higher political and economic stability of nations with a
structure of executive based on parliamentary monarchy and monarchy (see Tabb. 1-2; Fig. 6).
These
findings, based on statistical evidence, are synthesized in the figure 7 and 8.
This study now moves on to discuss the results, trying, as far as possible, to
clarify the relation between leadership-oriented executive and socioeconomic -
technological performances of nations.
Figure 10. Percolation of leadership by
specific structures of executive that support higher levels of technological
and economic performances of nations, ceteris
paribus
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Understanding
the determinants of innovation is a key goal of the economics of technological
change to explain dissimilar technological and economic performances of
nations. One of the main problems in this research field is how the structure of executive affects
national level of innovative activities.
The study
here can provide a conceptual integration of the VOC and Spencer et al. (2005) theoretical framework
arguing that some typologies of structure of executive, leadershiporiented, can
influence (positively) innovative
activities of countries (fig. 10).
Specifically,
statistical evidence above seems in general to support the hypothesis α stated in the methodology that higher
average levels of GDP per capita, energy consumption and electric power production
per capita (proxy of economic and technological performances) of nations can be
also explained by specific leadership-oriented executives, e.g. Monarchy and Parliamentary Monarchy, which induce a higher
political stability over the long run, ceteris
paribus (cf., Guarini and
Pattaro, 2016). Vice versa, countries
based on mixed executives can have a weak leadership in the structure of
government that generate a political instability and, as a consequence, lower
levels of economic and technological performances.
As debate
surrounds the adequacy of the VOC theory of innovation and Spencer et al.
(2005) theoretical framework, the study's findings here suggest that the
structure of government of countries may be a critical factor to explain some
differences of innovative activities.
In short, a
clear and stronger leadership in executives of countries seems to be a main
factor for supporting political stability and higher technological and
socioeconomic performances over time. Broberg et al. (2013, p. 2574) argue
that: “national political institutions typified by strong state authority and
corporatist societies were found to create higher levels of applied innovative
activity”. Ryan and Tipu (2013, p. 2116) show that: “active leadership has a
strong and significant positive effect on innovation propensity, while
passive-avoidant leadership has a significant but weakly positive effect on
innovation propensity” (cf., Fernandez et al., 2008).
One of the
contributing factors of this positive relation between parliamentary
monarchy/monarchy and higher levels of economic and technological performance
can be due to longer political stability of countries with leadership-oriented
executives. In fact, political stability has a positive effect on economic
growth and other socioeconomic activities (cf., Hussain Tabassam et al.,
2016).
This study
provides some contributions to the socioeconomic literature on these topics,
such as:
(1)
A conceptual integration of VOC and Spencer et al.
(2005) theoretical framework by considering a new theoretical linkage between
typologies of executive and a broader set of innovative and economic
performances of countries (e.g., GDP per capita, energy consumption and
electric power production per capita).
(2)
The conceptual framework here assigns a central role to
the executive leadershiporiented, which is a factor neglected by certain of the
dominant approaches to clarify contributing factors of higher levels of
innovative activities and differences of technological – socioeconomic performances
of nations;
(3)
The conceptual framework here seems in general to show
that specific types of executive, e.g. Monarchy and Parliamentary Monarchy
established by Constitution and law, support a clear leadership of government
that induces longer political stability, higher wealth and innovative
activities over the long run;
This
conceptual framework seems to be consilient (Thagard, 1988, Chp. 5), since it
explains a greater number of socio-economic facts concerning higher
technological performances of nations. Moreover, the simple elements of the
study here are well known in economic and social sciences. The idea that
leadership is associated to fruitful technological performance is not new and
already used in social and political sciences (Jung et al., 2008; Krause,
2004). However, the idea that leadership-oriented executives may be one of
contributing factors that influences the political stability has not been used
in literature to explain the different patterns of technological and economic
performance across nations over time.
The characteristic of analogy of the
results here is well-established in many studies of management and industrial
organization (cf., Makri and Scandura, 2010; Carmeli et al., 2010; Nelson,
1999;).
In short, the
typology of executive can help to explain differences between-countries
innovative performances and can be a main factor to be considered in VOC and
Spencer et al. (2005) theories. Perhaps the most interesting finding of this
study is that Monarchy and Parliamentary Monarchy, rather than Mixed Executive
support longer political stability, higher innovative activities and fruitful
historical developmental paths.
However, the
current study here is exploratory in nature and examines only a limited number
of variables. Moreover, the findings are contest-dependent because the
geo-political structure of countries can change over time and space. Although
this study offers important contributions to knowledge in these research
fields, the study's findings need to be considered in light of their
limitations. In fact, countries within the same political regime and type of
executive have a high heterogeneity due to structural differences in political,
cultural and social system that affect the technological and economic performances.
Hence, some results discussed here should be considered with great caution
because they are based on aggregate data of different countries with the same
typology of executive. To exploring the general implications of this study,
future research should also consider some controls and intervening variables
that may be useful in providing a deeper and richer explanation of these
phenomena of interests (e.g., institutional contexts, electoral systems, level
of democratization, etc.). Future efforts could also examine other
technometrics that more closely related to innovative activities.
Overall,
then, the results of this study are of course tentative, since we know that
other things are often not equal over time and space. In particular, more fine-grained
studies will be useful in future, ones that can more easily examine other
complex factors of socioeconomic systems that explain the dissimilar economic
performance within and outside the same political regime and type of executive.
Much work remains to understand the complex relations between executive of
nations, their internal and external leadership and technological -
socioeconomic performance to provide additional explanatory elements for a
comprehensive VOC and Spencer et al. (2005) theory. To conclude, most of the
focus here is on some typologies of executives and variables, clearly
important, but not sufficient for broader understanding of how political -
institutional structures affect national level of innovative activity of
several nations over the long run.
6. APPENDIX A
Table 1A:
Countries with Type of Executive in 2003
|
Monarchy
|
Parliamentary Monarchy
|
||
|
Country
|
Region
|
Country
|
Region
|
|
Bahrain
|
Middle East
|
Andorra
|
Western Europe
|
|
Bhutan
|
Asia-Pacific
|
Antigua & Barbuda
|
South America
|
|
Brunei Darussalam
|
Asia-Pacific
|
Australia
|
Asia-Pacific
|
|
Jordan
|
Middle East
|
Bahamas
|
South America
|
|
Kuwait
|
Middle East
|
Barbados
|
South America
|
|
Monaco
|
Western Europe
|
Belgium
|
Western Europe
|
|
Morocco
|
Middle East
|
Belize
|
South America
|
|
Nepal
|
Asia-Pacific
|
Cambodia
|
Asia-Pacific
|
|
Oman
|
Middle East
|
Canada
|
North America
|
|
Qatar
|
Middle East
|
Denmark
|
Scandinavia
|
|
Saudi Arabia
|
Middle East
|
Grenada
|
South America
|
|
Swaziland
|
Africa
|
Jamaica
|
South America
|
|
Tonga
|
Asia-Pacific
|
Japan
|
Asia-Pacific
|
|
|
|
Lesotho
|
Africa
|
|
|
|
Liechtenstein
|
Western Europe
|
|
|
|
Luxembourg
|
Western Europe
|
|
|
|
Malaysia
|
Asia-Pacific
|
|
|
|
Netherlands
|
Western Europe
|
|
|
|
New Zealand
|
Asia-Pacific
|
|
|
|
Norway
|
Scandinavia
|
|
|
|
Papua New Guinea
|
Asia-Pacific
|
|
|
|
Samoa
|
Asia-Pacific
|
|
|
|
Solomon Islands
|
Asia-Pacific
|
|
|
|
Spain
|
Western Europe
|
|
|
|
St. Kitts & Nevis
|
South America
|
|
|
|
St. Lucia
|
South America
|
|
|
|
St. Vincent &
Grenadine
|
South America
|
|
|
|
Sweden
|
Scandinavia
|
|
|
|
Thailand
|
Asia-Pacific
|
|
|
|
Tuvalu
|
Asia-Pacific
|
|
|
|
United Kingdom
|
Western Europe
|
Note: Mixed Executives are not reported
due to the long list of countries. Other types of executive, e.g. Presidential Republic, are not
considered because data are misleading.
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[1] Coccia, 2005, 2007, 2008a,
2009, 2009d, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2015a; Wright, 2005; cf. also Spolaore and
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[2] Cf. also Coccia 2009c, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2014b, 2015b,
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[3] cf. Hernandez, 2008; Coccia (2001; 2008, 2009a, 2009b), Coccia and
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[4] Other types of executive,
such as Presidential Republic, are not considered because data are
misleading.
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